Standard agency theory suggests that rational voters will vote to re-elect politicians who deliver favorable outcomes. A second implication is that rational voters will not support a politician because of good outcomes unrelated to the politician's actions. Specifically, rational voters should try to filter signal from noise, both in order to avoid electing incompetent, but lucky politicians, and to maximize the link between their votes and optimal incentives. This paper provides insight into the information processing capacities of voters, by measuring the extent to which they irrationally reward state governors for economic fluctuations that are plausibly unrelated to gubernatorial actions. Simple tests of relative performance evaluation reveal that voters evaluate their state's economic performance relative to the national economy. However, these tests only provide evidence of rule-of-thumb performance filtering. More sophisticated tests reveal that voters in oil-producing states tend to re-elect incumbent governors during oil price rises, and vote them out of office when the oil price drops. Similarly, voters in procyclical states are consistently fooled into re-electing incumbents during national booms, only to dump them during national recessions. Consistent with an emerging behavioral literature, this suggests that voters make systematic attribution errors and are best characterized as quasi-rational.
I. Introduction
Are voters rational? Although economists have devised models of political business cycles under the contrasting assumptions of voter rationality and voter naïveté, there is not much direct empirical evidence on how well voters process information when making political choices. This paper provides a very simple and direct test of voter rationality, analyzing data on all gubernatorial elections in all fifty U.S. states since World War II.
My test of rationality derives from the agency problem that exists between voters and their elected officials. Voters are concerned with re-electing competent leaders, but cannot directly observe effort and ability. Standard principal-agent theory suggests that voters should base their vote on observable indicators of competence, including economic performance. If voters are rational-in the sense of efficiently processing information-they will reward good economic outcomes that reflect the governor's actions, but filter from their assessment economic events that reflect influences outside the politician's locus of control. This paper examines the extent to which voters rationally reward competence and irrationally reward luck. Assessing competence involves a standard signal extraction problem, and imperfect performance filtering reflects inefficient inference about gubernatorial ability.
Inefficient inference is equated with irrationality because it raises the probability of re-electing incompetent, but lucky incumbents, and lowers the probability of re-electing unlucky, but competent governors.
1 Responding to noise in addition to signal also weakens the link between a politician's actions and their electoral consequences, and thus dilutes political accountability and the power of incentives wielded by voters.
State economic outcomes are subject to important shocks caused by identifiably exogenous influences, and hence state gubernatorial elections provide an ideal testing ground of voter rationality.
To preview the results, I find evidence that voters make some attempt to decompose observed economic performance into results reflecting the competence of politicians and those reflecting other causes.
Arguably, they are at least as successful at this task as corporate boards are when setting CEO compensation. Tests of relative performance evaluation reveal that voters appear to focus on the performance of the state economy relative to the national norm. However, instrumental variables tests of performance filtering reveal that certain fine-grained distinctions elude voters, and the incumbent's reelection prospects are systematically related to factors outside their control. For instance, governors in oil-producing states are likely to be re-elected following a rise in oil prices, while their counterparts in the rust-belt are likely to be ousted. That is, only approximate rule-of-thumb adjustments are made when 1. In the words of Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997, p.35) , "a naïve voter would punish an unlucky incumbent, whereas a rational voter would, at least in part, take bad luck into consideration."
II. The Political Agency Problem
The identification of voter rationality in this paper derives from the principal-agent model.
Voters are principals and politicians are their agents. Agency problems arise because voters cannot observe all of the politician's actions and effort choice. This gives the politician scope to pursue his or her personal agenda rather than that of the constituents.
Results in the political agency literature largely shadow those in the standard principal-agent literature. Just as greater productivity can be elicited from workers by linking their wages with indicators that are correlated with their effort, voters can motivate a politician to better serve their will by linking votes to observable outcomes. Further, just as employers are concerned with retaining only high quality workers, so too voters are interested in re-electing competent governors. Poor outcomes are evidence of incompetence, and hence suggest that the agent (the governor) should be fired.
Thus, rational voters will link their vote to observable outcomes that reflect competence and effort, so as to both oust incompetent or rent-seeking incumbents and to provide incentives that elicit effort. This first implication is typically called retrospective economic voting. There is substantial evidence of a robust correlation between strong economic outcomes and the re-election of incumbent politicians in national elections. 4 However, influential papers in both political science (Chubb, 1988) and economics (Peltzman, 1987) have suggested this relationship does not hold at the state level. Section 3 reviews these results, and concludes that they reflect inadequate data, and that retrospective economic voting is an important factor in gubernatorial elections.
Sections 4 and 5 then turn to evaluating the extent to which voters reward luck (exogenous factors) as compared with competence. Recall that the earlier characterization of rationality implies that events unrelated to a governor's competence should have no effect on the voting decisions of rational agents. 5 Thus section 4 implements tests of relative performance evaluation, while section 5 turns to more sophisticated tests of performance filtering. Section 6 discusses remaining questions regarding endogeneity, and section 7 concludes.
Three related literatures are worth mentioning. First, Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) reject the restrictions imposed by voter rationality in a four-equation structural model relating congressional and presidential elections, competence, and output growth. Their test is similar to mine in that they ask whether voters distinguish between variation in aggregate output that reflects competence and variation attributed to luck (as identified by their structural model). But their rejection of a rational voter model could reflect either voter irrationality, or a rejection of an excessively restrictive and highly 4. Fair (1978) documents the correlation between strong aggregate growth and re-election of the incumbent party in presidential races, Kramer (1971) analyzes congressional races, and Lewis-Beck (1988) documents similar findings for other OECD countries.
parameterized structural model. By contrast, the present paper tests rationality in a framework that minimizes assumptions about the structure of the economy. each column represents a different regression that analyzes a different indicator. That is, Table 1 5. Unlike many other applications of the principal-agent framework, risk aversion is not necessary for performance filtering to be optimal. 6. In the economic context, Durell's (1999) lab experiments suggest that employers underweigh task difficulty when assessing the productivity of employees. Weber, Rottenstreich, Camerer, and Knez (1996) find that experimental subjects tend to underweight group size when assessing the ability of group leaders to inspire coordination outcomes. Shea (1998) finds that the salaries of Major League baseball hitters (pitchers) are higher (lower) in more hitter-friendly home ballparks. 7. Data up until 1990 were extracted from ICPSR (1995) . From 1990 to 1997, data were handcoded from Congressional Quarterly (1998). 8. Thus, special elections were eliminated from the sample, as were both contests in which a third party gained more than 20% of the vote, and those that were largely uncontested (only one candidate, or a winning vote share in excess of 80%). Further, because first differences will be analyzed, the elections following any of these eliminated cases were also removed from the sample. 9. Where it was obvious, candidates were labeled as either Democrats or Republicans. The constituency represented by independent and other party candidates was inferred from the affiliation of the candidate they were opposing. 
Throughout this paper, independent variables are coded as changes over the two years leading up to the election. 10 The first column of Table 1 analyzes real personal income per capita data, which are included mainly to provide a link to the existing literature. 11 Peltzman (1987) found that these state income data were a poor predictor of gubernatorial election results, which he interpreted as evidence that voters believe that state governors have little effect on the local economy. Chubb (1988, p.150) analyzed similar data, concluding that this weak relationship suggests that "gubernatorial elections remain contests of party and personality and not of performance." (Furthermore, while Besley and Case (1995a) are concerned with analyzing the effects of tax policy on election outcomes, they also include state income growth as a control, finding it to be unrelated to the re-election prospects of incumbent governors.) Like all these authors, I find little evidence of a link between growth in state income and electoral outcomes.
There are two key reasons to be cautious about such findings. First, these state income data are subject to significant measurement error (especially in the earlier years), which biases estimated coefficients towards zero. Second, because the BEA publishes income per capita separately for each state but only compiles national deflators, it is impossible to disentangle whether measured income growth reflects a rise in real incomes (which voters would reward), or a rise in local prices (which they would punish). 12 Thus columns 2 and 3 examine alternative, and arguably preferable, economic indices.
The unemployment rate provides a natural measure of shifts in the real economy. Unfortunately, state unemployment data are only available since the mid-1960s, and even then, are unreliable for small states. I therefore constructed a proxy indicator for the unemployment rate, the employment gap. This is constructed from the more comprehensive non-farm payrolls data, and measures the deviation of log employment from its trend level. (To see the analogy, note that the unemployment rate is approximately equal to the deviation of log employment from another slow-moving trend, the log labor force. 
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Although these data are only available since 1980, they still reveal a strong and statistically significant relationship between state performance and the re-election prospects of the incumbent party.
The magnitudes in Table 1 are directly interpretable. For instance, a 1 percentage point fall in the employment gap is associated with a 0.27 percentage point rise in the governing party's share of the vote. While this is both larger and more significant than analogous estimates in the existing literature on state elections, it is somewhat smaller than its counterpart in the literature on presidential elections.
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In sum, Table 1 provides reasonably strong evidence that the state of the economy affects the reelection prospects of the incumbent party. Only one indicator-growth in state income-fails to reveal this correlation; this is also the indicator that has received the most attention in the existing literature.
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IV. Testing Voter Rationality: Relative Performance Filtering
The simplest test of the principal-agent predictions follows from tests of "relative performance evaluation" common in the literature on the determinants of CEO pay (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990) . In both cases the basic idea is that principals should not reward agents for national trends but only for how 13. These data are available at: www.ofheo.gov, and were deflated using the chain GDP deflator. 14. For example, Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) 
The estimated coefficient α is characterized as the reward for gubernatorial competence, and λ measures the reward for "luck." Rational voters should be unmoved by false signals, so rationality implies that λ=0. Conversely, the psychology literature on attribution errors suggests that environmental or background factors are under-weighed in assessments of competence, leading to λ>0. At the other extreme, Gibbons and Murphy test (and reject) the null that principals do not distinguish at all between signal and noise when assessing CEOs (α=λ).
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The effect of national and state-specific economic performance on the fate of incumbents is shown in Table 2 . elections in which the incumbent was either barred by virtue of term limits or chose to run for higher office were dropped from the sample. Table 2 shows strong evidence of performance filtering by voters. The coefficients reported in the first row of each panel show that a state's relative economic health is an important factor in gubernatorial elections; local economic factors were found to be highly significant (and correctly signed) in five of the six regressions. (Again, data on personal income per capita yield inconclusive results.
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The second row asks whether voters are fooled by developments at the national level. In no case can the 16. The CEO pay literature contains papers that reject both the rationality null (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001) , and this latter irrationality null (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990 null that voters rationally filter out these false signals be rejected. 19 The third row tests the opposite null of no performance filtering. I reject this null for the employment gap. The tests using housing price and state income data yield little statistical power.
Thus Table 2 suggests both that the state economy has important effects on electoral outcomes, and that performance is evaluated relative to a national yardstick. This is consistent with Besley and
Case's evidence of yardstick competition in tax setting. Besley and Case (1995a, p.35 ) also analyze unemployment and income growth, and conclude that "while it is possible for citizens to give the governor a relative grade based on these criteria, it does not appear that voters are judging governors in this way." This conclusion was based on only 85 elections, which yielded fairly imprecise estimates.
Thus, a preferable interpretation is that they lacked the statistical power to answer this question.
20 Table 3 explores the possibility that confounding factors are driving the results in Table 2 . The first row of Table 3 simply repeats the central estimates from Table 2 The α and λ coefficients retain their interpretation as the returns to competence and luck, respectively.
My central estimates appear roughly unchanged by this modification. The coefficients on control variables are not reported in Table 3 , but across all three specifications the president's party fares about 4 percentage points worse than the opposition party. This magnitude is similar to the mid-term slump suffered by the president's party in congressional elections. The interaction term captures the extent to 19. A natural question when assessing the effects of the national cycle is whether to estimate standard errors as though there are 636 independent experiments in the data, or whether there is effectively only one independent experiment each year. Fortunately theory resolves the issue: under the null of voter rationality there will be no cross-state correlation in anti-incumbent sentiment, and hence each observation is an independent experiment. (Empirically, the results presented are largely unaffected by this choice.)
which the incumbent governor is helped or harmed by voters expressing (dis)satisfaction with the president's handling of the economy, and is statistically significant only in the real income data.
A less parameterized set of controls is included in the third row of Table 3 , which interacts the President's Party variable with a full set of year fixed effects. These interaction terms control for all national swings in partisan sentiment, not simply those reflecting national economic performance, and again α and λ are directly comparable with the estimates in Table 2 . The interaction terms are strongly significant, suggesting that the national partisan mood is at least partly expressed in state elections.
(Alternatively, partisan preferences may vary with economic conditions.) The fourth row also adds state fixed effects. Political preferences may also vary over the business cycle. While the interaction of President's Party with year fixed effects partials out much of this variation, the fifth row also controls for the interaction of a Party variable with state conditions. This interaction is both small and statistically insignificant. The sixth row also adds direct year fixed effects. These year fixed effects render the national cycle unidentified, and hence I report only the coefficient on relative state performance.
21 Year fixed effects partial out swings in pro-or anti-incumbency sentiment, while the interacted year fixed effects control for swings in partisan sentiment. Both sets of controls are extremely statistically significant, yet the estimated returns to competence remain approximately unchanged. A similar investigation of the probit specification yields analogous evidence that the results from the simple specification in Table 2 are quite robust.
A further set of concerns arises from the possibility that basic parameters of the voting decision vary with economic conditions. Two examples seem salient. First, it may be that voters are fooled by a national downturn into inferring that the incumbent is of low quality, but feel that a recession is an inappropriate time to experiment with a new governor. This fear may be motivated by the possibility that either the advantages of electing an experienced governor, or voters' risk aversion, may vary with the state of the economy. Second, information revelation may vary with the cycle. Consider a simple asymmetry: it may be that the potential for a governor to distinguish herself as either competent or 20. Alt, Lowry, and Ferree (1998, p.763) appear to have stumbled upon evidence of relative performance evaluation in their work assessing the incumbent's vote share. When discussing specifications that they discarded, they state "when we include separate variables for national and state income growth… coefficients on the national income growth variable are insignificant or perversely negative" (emphasis added). Of course, the finding that voters subtract the national growth rate from state growth when assessing the incumbent is not perverse, but rather, evidence of performance filtering. 21. Because the national performance variable for each state is, in fact, the performance of the United States excluding that state, strictly speaking this variable remains identified. However, it is only identified to the extent that the state's performance differs from the national norm, and hence including it would only confound interpretation of the coefficient on relative state performance.
incompetent only occurs during a boom, and that unless convinced of gubernatorial incompetence, most voters choose to re-elect the incumbent. This asymmetry would lead to anti-incumbent swings only during a national boom, confounding the pro-incumbent swing caused by voters making attribution errors.
Central to both of these examples is the possibility that my results are driven by an asymmetry. Table 4 shows that the estimated returns to competence and luck appear robust even after dropping data from either periods of robust growth or recession.
In sum, the findings in Table 1 suggest that economic voting is relevant in state elections. voters appear not to be fooled by improvements in the state economy that are due to the national cycle. Table 3 shows that this result appears not to be driven by confounding variation. Table 4 demonstrates that these results are not identified by an asymmetry. The next section provides more sophisticated instrumental variables tests of whether voters filter a range of other exogenous shocks from their voting decisions. The ensuing section will return to some of the subtler questions regarding the identification and interpretation of these results.
V. Instrumental Variables Tests of Voter Rationality
The basic approach of these tests of voter rationality is to find sources of variation in economic performance that are unrelated to a politician's actions, and then test whether these false signals fool voters into inferring competence. Whereas the previous section tested whether variation in the state economy due to the national cycle affected voting behavior, this section extends this analysis to a range of other shocks. Specifically, I aim to isolate specific driving forces of state fluctuations that are plausibly unrelated to a governor's actions. Rather than simply regress the change in the incumbent's vote share on these exogenous variables, this section applies instrumental variables (IV) methods that facilitate direct comparison of the returns to luck and the returns to competence.
The IV approach clarifies the conditions under which tests of performance filtering are valid.
Furthermore, it provides a direct generalization of standard tests of relative performance evaluation to examine whether a range of factors exogenous to the governor's decisions affect voting behavior. 22 A first stage regression partitions variation in state economic performance into that which clearly does not reflect gubernatorial competence, and a residual component that may, in part, reflect competence. The second stage regression assesses the link between re-election prospects and these indicators of gubernatorial competence and luck.
To understand the link between this and the previous section, it is useful to re-conceptualize the simple tests of relative performance evaluation in Tables 2 to 4 in an IV framework. 
22. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) provide a related approach.
While G s,t denotes "gubernatorial competence," the residual variation, s ,t υ will be referred to as "unobserved luck". Thus, the estimated α coefficient in the voting equation is identified off this amalgam of competence and unobserved luck and will be a weighted average of the returns to competence and the returns to this unobserved luck.
Although X s,t and s ,t υ are labeled "observed luck" and "unobserved luck," respectively, this refers to observability by the econometrician. The extent to which voters observe s ,t υ is unknown, complicating any intuition regarding the extent to which α accurately reflects the returns to competence.
(X s,t , by virtue of its observability to naïve econometricians, is assumed to be observable to voters.)
Three central cases will clarify the relationship between α and the true causal effects of competence on re-election prospects.
First, if "unobserved luck," s ,t υ , is not observed by voters, then they cannot distinguish between the noise and signal elements of , and hence they reward both at the same rate. Thus, in this case, α accurately represents the returns to the governor of making competent decisions.
Second, if "unobserved luck," s ,t υ , is observed by rational voters, they will fully discount it, and hence α reflects an attenuated estimate of the returns to competence.
The third case is a generalization of this result. If s ,t υ is observed by voters, and they suffer the same cognitive biases as when assessing "observed luck," X s,t , then α will reflect a weighted average of the returns to luck and the returns to competence. Weaker first stage regressions exacerbate this bias by putting more of the elements of "luck" in 
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In sum, an appropriately exogenous instrument isolates a source of variation in economic performance that reflects only "luck." Hence the estimated λ and δ coefficients accurately reflect the returns to luck (albeit different sources of luck). However, the difficulty in fully separating variation due to competence from that due to luck means that estimated returns to competence are probably biased towards the returns to luck. Thus, assuming that the true returns to luck do not exceed the true returns to competence, α is a downward biased estimate of the causal effect of competence on re-election prospects.
The regressions in each column of Table 5 and 6 reflect different instrument sets. In Table 5 , I test whether voters filter out state-level economic fluctuations that are attributable to oil shocks. Oil prices are an ideal instrument both because they are unlikely to be affected by gubernatorial competence and because they cause a boom in oil producing states, and a downturn in rust-belt states. The second column imposes more structure on the instrument for luck. Rather than simply allow the effects of oil prices to vary independently across states, this column imposes the restriction that these different sensitivities reflect different industry mixes. Thus, the fifty state-specific instruments are replaced with nine instruments, each reflecting the interaction of the national cycle with the share of each 
State industry shares are measured using BEA data on Earnings by Industry. 25 These industry 23.α is a biased estimate of the returns to competence for reasons analogous to the weak instruments problem (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker, 1997) .
is only a weak instrument for G s,t and, the weaker the first stage regression, the more likely it is thatα will be biased towards the coefficient from an OLS regression of ∆Incumbent's vote on State performance. 24. Oil price data are annual averages of the Crude Petroleum PPI, deflated using the chain GDP deflator. Alternative oil price data yield similar results. 25. State Earnings data were downloaded from www.bea.doc.gov. This national accounting aggregate includes wage and salary disbursements, other labor income, and proprietors' income.
shares are measured using historical data (the average share of state earnings in the 1940s), so that it is clear that these do not represent the legacy of any incumbent governor in this sample. The first stage regression reveals that states with historically large manufacturing and service sectors are particularly vulnerable to oil price rises, while states with large mining, finance, construction, and farm sectors have a more muted sensitivity; transport and wholesale trade are approximately neutral.
26 These first stage results yield predicted state sensitivities that are both plausible and comparable with those in column one (the range of predicted state sensitivities is shown in Panel A).
Turning to the returns to luck and competence in Panels B and C, column two largely reinforces the results from column one. Voters appear to perform simple rule-of-thumb adjustments, but by failing to take account of the effects of oil prices on state economic outcomes resulting from the state's historical industry mix, they make systematic attribution errors.
Note that the regressions in Panels B and C report standard (heteroscedasticity consistent) OLS standard errors. These standard errors are biased downward because they do not account of the extra uncertainty associated with the analysis of generated regressors. Rather than attempting to analytically derive the relevant standard errors for the case in which both a predicted value and its residual are included as regressors, I also report bootstrapped standard errors. These yield standard error estimates [shown in square brackets] are remarkably close to the White standard errors. 
Shadowing results in Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Davis, Loungani, and Mahidhara (1997) , Panel A shows statistically and economically significant differences in cyclical sensitivities, ranging from Michigan, which is extremely pro-cyclical, to Alaska, which is in fact counter-cyclical. Tables 2 to 4 , the first rows in Panels B and C of Table 6 suggest that voters at least perform rule-of-thumb signal extraction, comparing their state outcomes with the national norm, and there is no (statistically discernible) systematic tendency for national booms to lead to the re-election of incumbents. However, the second row strongly rejects the notion that voters are using a fully rational signal extraction rule. That is, in pro-cyclical states a national boom leads to an even stronger local boom, and voters are fooled by the relative strength of their state compared with the 26. The logic behind the result for agriculture is slightly altered by the fact that the employment data are non-farm payrolls. To be clear, the regression finds that the non-farm sector is less sensitive to oil prices in farming-intensive states. Similar interpretation issues arise in Table 6 . national average into voting for the incumbent, presumably based upon a mistaken inference of gubernatorial competence. On the flipside, these same voters are too quick to oust the incumbent in a downturn. In those states with a more muted business cycle, a symmetric, but opposite pattern occurs, with excessive turnover in national booms and a (relative) status quo bias in downturns. The third row continues to confirm that the residual variation in economic performance -a rough proxy for competence -has explanatory power.
Consistent with the message in
As with Table 5 , the second column of Table 6 
The first stage regression reveals that states with historically large manufacturing, wholesale trade, and service sectors tend to be more sensitive to the national cycle, while agriculture, construction, finance, and government sectors yield a more muted sensitivity; transport and mining are approximately neutral.
The results in column two reinforce those in column one. Again, there is no systematic national tendency to vote for incumbents in a national upswing (or against them in a downturn). However, an upswing leads those in pro-cyclical states to vote for the incumbent, while their peers in counter-cyclical states vote against the incumbent. A downturn leads to the opposite conclusion.
A full battery of checks shadowing those in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that the basic results in Tables 5 and 6 are robust. Appendix C also explores questions regarding the potential endogeneity of oil prices, and yields fairly similar results. I also examined a variety of other sources of luck, including Canadian/US dollar exchange rate movements interacted with proximity to the border, a Bartik (1991) instrument based on the interaction of industry shares and industry shocks, and weather-based instruments interacted with agricultural intensity. In each case, the first stage regressions yielded statistically significant relationships between the instrument and economic outcomes, but the instrument lacked sufficient power to offer much insight into the relationship with voting patterns.
In sum, the evidence accumulated above suggests that voters perform simple rule-of-thumb adjustments when evaluating gubernatorial competence. However, they still appear to make systematic attribution errors, and voters are systematically fooled into re-electing lucky but less competent governors.
VI. Endogeneity Issues
The instrumental variables analyzed in this paper are valid if they explain state economic performance, but do not have a direct effect on the voting decision of rational voters. In the related literature testing for performance filtering in CEO compensation, Himmelberg and Hubbard (1999) argue that aggregate instruments reflecting "luck" are also shocks to the demand for inelastically supplied CEO talent. Thus, even in the absence of attribution error, positive aggregate shocks will lead to a rise in CEO pay. However, while wages are set taking account of the outside option of the principal, this argument lacks a clear parallel in the voting context. Thus, elections arguably provide a cleaner test of attribution error than the CEO labor market.
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However, there are other possible reasons to doubt the IV exclusion restriction. Politicians have thus far been characterized as motivated solely by the desire for votes. Real governors also have other conflicting objectives, such as a desire to implement an ideological platform, or simply to extract rents.
The potential extra votes gained from a stellar economic performance may be spent in pursuing these alternative agendas.
28 Politicians who care only about partisan or rent-stealing objectives will spend all of their excess political capital on these objectives, and hence if all of the extra votes delivered by a booming economy are "spent" on these alternative, vote-losing activities, no correlation between economic performance and the vote for the incumbent would be observed.
Most likely is an intermediate case, in which politicians "spend" some of their extra votes pursuing unpopular projects. This endogenous response will attenuate my estimates of the returns to both luck and competence. However, the estimated returns to luck will be wrongly signed only in the perverse case when for every hundred extra votes delivered to the incumbent governor by a booming economy, this renewed job security induces them to undertake so many unpopular projects that they lose over a hundred votes. Thus, as long as the marginal propensity to consume political capital is less than one, the estimated returns to luck are properly signed, albeit biased towards zero. Despite this bias, Tables 5 and 6 report significant and large returns to luck.
This paper also provides evidence on the extent to which the returns to luck differ from the returns to competence. If politicians have an equal propensity to "spend" the political capital gained through either competence or luck, then the estimated returns to both luck and competence will be biased towards zero. Indeed, this bias will affect them both in equal proportion, and hence their ratio will be 27. Further, in the CEO context, strategic incentives to commit to softer product competition (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999) , or the possibility of sabotage, collusion, or production externalities, may yield optimal contracts at odds with the standard of relative performance evaluation, undermining the inference of attribution error (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990) . These arguments also seem less applicable in the political domain. 28. In related evidence, Besley and Case (1995b) find that governors barred by term limits from running for re-election make systematically different decisions from those who have an eye on their re-election prospects.
unaffected, although their difference will also be biased towards zero. 
VII. Discussion
The principal-agent model suggests that voters will use information implicit in observable indicators-such as the state of the economy-to assess the competence of incumbent governors. This is strongly confirmed in the data. The second implication is that voters will discount variation in the state economy that is due to factors that bear no relation to gubernatorial competence. The data suggest that voters evaluate their state's economy relative to the national economy. However, these results suggest only rule-of-thumb performance filtering. Instrumental variables regressions indicate that voters in procyclical states are systematically fooled into re-electing incumbents during national booms, only to dump them during national recessions. Similarly, voters in oil-producing states tend to re-elect incumbent governors during oil price rises, while voters in oil-dependent states oust their incumbents.
While I interpret these results as rejecting strict voter rationality, evidence that voters do not act in strict accordance with the predictions of the principal-agent model does not necessarily infer irrationality. There may exist rational deviations from the principal-agent model, such as the preference of voters for stable leadership during periods of war. This is a specific example of a more general issue:
that almost any set of choices can be rationalized by appealing to a particular formulation of preferences.
Ultimately the plausibility of such a counter-argument rests upon the plausibility of the required preferences. The simplest explanation of my results is that voters are quasi-rational-while they assess state performance relative to a national yardstick, more fine-grained assessments remain elusive, and they make systematic attribution errors.
One potentially useful "rationality benchmark" is available from the literature on the determinants of CEO pay. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) analyze the sensitivity of CEO pay to a firm's rate of return on common stock. They find some evidence of performance filtering, and CEO pay is roughly unaffected by those aggregate shocks evident in a broad index of stock returns. However, 29. Again, one can construct a case in which this bias might lead one to wrongly reject the null that α=λ. This would only occur if politicians spend a greater proportion of the extra votes that they win through "luck," than those they win through competent governance.
shocks that are idiosyncratic to a firm's industry are only weakly filtered, if at all. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) provide recent confirmatory evidence that CEOs are as likely to be rewarded for industry-specific shocks as for effort. Further, they also analyze a sample of oil companies, and despite the obvious importance of oil prices to firm performance, they find little evidence of performance filtering. Measured against this yardstick, the rather similar performance of voters in assessing their agents is striking, especially given that voting typically involves small stakes.
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This paper has assessed the ability of voters to distinguish signal from noise when assessing the competence of their incumbent governor. The results suggest that voters do a reasonable, albeit imperfect job of disentangling variation in the economy due to competence from variation from other factors. As such, the results in this paper can help inform debates about the relative merits of rational and naïve voter models of political business cycles. Recall that the ability to distinguish signal from noise was central to distinguishing between models of rational and naïve voters. However, the question asked by these models differs subtly from the question examined in this paper. This paper analyzes whether voters respond to variation in state economic outcomes that reflects clearly exogenous and easily observed shocks. By contrast, in political business cycle models, the question is whether voters respond to variation in state economic outcomes that reflects pre-electoral policy manipulation by opportunistic politicians. While a rational signal-extraction rule dictates that voters should not respond to noise in either context, the costs and benefits of irrationality may differ across these domains. Specifically, note that politicians are likely to manipulate policy instruments in as opaque a manner as possible, raising the cost of making accurate inferences about their ability. However, the benefits of filtering out the effects of pre-election manipulation are also higher, as filtering-in addition to lowering the probability of occasionally re-electing an incompetent incumbent-also removes any incentive for incumbents to create wasteful output volatility. More direct evidence on how voting principals assess their elected political agents can help resolve these issues.
30. Sam Peltzman generously shared the data on state government spending from his 1992 QJE paper. 31. Note that Bertrand and Mullainathan show that corporate boards with greater interest in good governance yield CEO contracts closer to the principal-agent predictions. b Two-year ended change in the employment gap, measured in percentage points. Constructed from BLS non-farm payrolls data (see Appendix B for details). Results are coded so that a positive number denotes an improving economy (analogous to a declining unemployment rate). c Two-year ended percentage change in real housing prices. Housing prices are measured from a repeat sales index provided by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, deflated using the Chain GDP deflator. a Employment gap is coded so that a positive number denotes an improving economy (analogous to a declining unemployment rate). b Probit coefficients report the marginal change in the probability of re-election for a marginal change in economic outcomes, evaluated at cell means. c Re-elected incumbents are coded to a value of 1. Incumbents who lost a primary race, a general election, or who decided not to run again are coded as 0. Incumbents who ran for higher office, or were barred from re-election by term limits are dropped from the sample.
Tables -3 Probit coefficients report the marginal change in the probability of re-election for a marginal change in the employment gap, evaluated at cell means. Re-elected incumbents are coded to a value of 1. Incumbents who lost a primary race, a general election, or who decided not to run again are coded as 0. Incumbents who ran for higher office, or were barred from re-election by term limits, are dropped from the sample.
Tables -6 Probit coefficients report the marginal change in the probability of re-election for a marginal change in the employment gap, evaluated at cell means. Re-elected incumbents are coded to a value of 1. Incumbents who lost a primary race, a general election, or who decided not to run again are coded as 0. Incumbents who ran for higher office, or were barred from re-election by term limits, are dropped from the sample. The basic data are annual average non-farm payrolls data by state compiled by the BLS. These data provide a consistent and reliable indicator of employment going back to the pre-war period. The employment gap is defined as the deviation of the natural log of employment from its trend level, which is estimated by applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter to the data. The top figure shows the construction of a national employment gap. Next the estimated employment gap and the unemployment rate are shown. The final figure shows that constructed state employment gaps co-move closely with the unemployment rate over the period in which both are available. Despite these similarities, there remain important conceptual differences between the employment gap and the unemployment rate. By construction the employment gap has a mean of zero for all states, and is meanreverting. Further, the employment gap contains only business cycle and higher frequency variation.
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